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Glossary 	  
Term/Abbreviation Definition 
AB (California State) Assembly Bill 
CCSE California Center for Sustainable Energy 
CEC California Energy Commission 
CPUC California Public Utilities Commission 
CSI California Solar Initiative 
CSP Concentrating Solar Power 
DE Distributed Energy 
DG Distributed Generation 
FIT Feed-In Tariff 
FITC Federal Investment Tax Credit 
IOU Investor-Owned Utility 
LADWP Los Angeles Department of Water & 
Power 
NEG Net Excess Generation 
NEG Net Excess Generation 
NEM Net Energy Metering 
PG&E Pacific Gas & Electric 
POU Publicly-Owned Utility 
PV Photovoltaic 
REC Renewable Energy Credit 
SCE Southern California Edison 
SDG&E San Diego Gas & Electric 
SITC Solar Investment Tax Credit 
SMUD Sacramento Municipal Utility District 
SWRCB State Water Resource Control Board 
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Introduction 
One of the most substantial factors that determines human interactions with the 
environment is the dominant energy paradigm—everything from choice of energy 
sources to conservations habits—within which a society functions.  This paradigm was 
static and primitive for a vast majority of our specie’s time scale, but has been since the 
Industrial Revolution irrevocably and even subsequently adjusted.  Though the 
dominant fuels have changed from coal to oil and natural gas, their fossil nature 
remains unsustainably unchanged.   As global climate change—intrinsically linked with 
patterns of energy production, distribution, and use—obtains the grave and dedicated 
focus that it merits, world citizens and governments will have to reevaluate 
contemporary energy production and delivery systems.  The continued reliance on 
fossil fuels to power growing economies worldwide through energy and other 
byproducts is inherently a losing proposition, as considered from both the input and 
effluent perspectives.   
As of yet, the alternative of widespread renewable implementation has been 
greatly underexplored.  International exemplars of renewable deployment include 
Germany and Spain, both with significantly different cultures and government 
structures than the United States.  Where these European countries have succeeded in 
subsidizing and otherwise incentivizing the installation of alternative energy capacity, a 
less successful California has been the lead state for the US, in a longstanding trickle-up 
policy tradition.  Trickle-up policy refers to the idea that sub-federal governments can 
“pilot” policies, so to speak, the success of which leads to widespread federal adoption.  
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I hope to be able to clarify the tangle of laws, cash and tax incentives, and other 
programs that California has implemented toward its ambitious targets for renewable 
energy.   
Through the examination of US federal and California state energy policy, this 
thesis seeks to foster greater deployment of distributed-generation (DG) solar 
photovoltaic (PV) energy production capacity.  Today’s energy landscape in California 
does not commonly live up to the myth of a solar and renewable “mecca,”1 much has 
been the case in Europe.  Along with the significant up-front financing and long 
payback periods required of such projects, there is less long-term security for US 
investors that energy fed back into the grid will bring in revenue.  Therefore, this 
research will build off of a theoretical literature-based understanding of energy policy 
in California to explore the various business models that have emerged to both take 
advantage of government incentives as well as open up the option for rooftop solar 
installation to those without the required up-front financing. 
In order to approach the complex political issues behind California’s renewable 
energy incentives structure, considerable effort must be focused on the underlying 
conditions of climate change, energy mix, and social welfare.  A successful solution will 
be one that can mitigate adverse effects on the climate and provide a low-cost, low-risk 
energy portfolio.  The underlying goal of this paper is to illuminate possibilities for 
residential and commercial customers to take advantage of creative business models in 
solar installation, financing, and maintenance.  But while the policy discussion operates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Toke,	  D.	  Ecological	  Modernisation	  and	  Renewable	  Energy.	  2011.	  98.	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mainly in the context of current policy, it will also evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of that policy so that future laws might resonate more beneficially with DG 
renewable energy. 
Concepts from the fields of deep ecology, Jeremy Rifkin’s work on the “Third 
Industrial Revolution,” and energy policy frameworks underpin the discussion and 
evaluation of California’s renewable policy programs.  
Deep Ecology Perspective 
Deep ecology and energy policy do not usually go hand-in-hand.  But a deep 
ecology perspective in fact informs the exploration of energy paradigms in a broader 
sense, with policy relegated a tool to implement these critical insights.  When 
considering a much larger time scale than the typical discussion of human history 
entails, energy emerges as a pivotal culprit in the contemporary affliction of global 
climate change.  There is certainly no room in modern discourse, much less in this 
paper, for a discussion of the merits of “climate change” as a “hypothesis.”  Therefore, 
this discussion operates on the assumption that anthropogenic climate change is indeed 
an immediate threat to not only ecological health, but also social and economic welfare 
worldwide.  With this in mind, altering the energy landscape has dramatic potential to 
effectively curb carbon emissions and other forms of local pollution, while 
simultaneously increasing the supply of energy to match rising global demand. 
The deep ecology movement has inspired an impressive literature, but is a 
unique theory in that its genesis is easily traced and understood.  It stems from the 
twentieth century’s dual development of a strong environmental sentiment—embodied 
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in the likes of Aldo Leopold, John Muir and Rachel Carson—and a richer scientific 
understanding of ecological dynamics.  Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess in 1973 
clearly laid out the core principles of deep ecology in contrast with what he termed 
“shallow ecology.”  This duality between deep and shallow specifically refers to time 
scale, the ethical and moral consideration of non-human entities, and social equality 
across nations of different development levels.   
While Naess’ characterization lays out seven principles of deep ecology, two are 
especially relevant to the topic at hand.  Number 5 –“Fight against pollution and 
resource depletion”2—is interesting in that Naess also uses it to describe the central 
concern of shallow ecology.  He in fact embraces the fact that both types of ecology hold 
this value dear, but emphasizes that deep ecologists do not do so at the expense of 
“evils of the other kinds,” referring to the exacerbation of class struggles and ethical 
dilemmas brought about by a single ecological focus.  Number 7—“Local autonomy 
and decentralization”—lends legitimacy to the distributed generation energy 
framework to be discussed throughout this paper.  Here, deep ecologists highlight the 
untangling of complex political hierarchies in favor of local self-control.  Importantly, 
Naess also posits, “Pollution problems, including those of thermal pollution and 
recirculation of materials, also lead us in this direction, because increased local 
autonomy, if we are able to keep other factors constant, reduces energy consumption.”3  
By reducing imported foodstuffs and energy from concentrated growing operations and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Naess,	  A.	  "The	  Shallow	  and	  the	  Deep,	  Long-­‐Range	  Ecology	  Movement.	  A	  Summary."	  1973.	  97.	  3	  Ibid.	  98.	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electricity producers, communities can deplete natural resources more sustainably and 
keep in check the environmental effluents related to everyday activities.   
These deep ecological principles have in turn inspired much of the work by 
Jeremy Rifkin, discussed below, in a wide array of environmental policy areas.  With an 
idea of humans’ place within a broader ecological community, the need to shift energy 
supply away from high-polluting, resource-depleting sources to sustainable, renewable 
modes becomes essential.  Such a shift is fundamental not only to the long-term 
survival of the human species, but also to greater social equity across communities and 
between countries, and inherently the welfare of all sorts of creatures and 
environments.   
Rifkin’s “Third Industrial Revolution” Framework 
In his most recent book, Jeremy Rifkin describes a reconceptualization of the 
industrial landscape as significant as that of the Industrial Revolution.  Rifkin is a 
widely lauded economic and political advisor, and has as an activist who written on a 
breadth of topics from policy dealing with genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in 
agriculture to the role of entropy in economic development.  Whatever the specific 
topic, Rifkin’s work usually synthesizes economic insight with ecological 
understanding and knowledge of political structures.  In The Third Industrial Revolution: 
How Lateral Power Is Transforming Energy, the Economy, and the World, he accurately 
depicts humans’ impact on the environment through the lens of energy procurement.   
Rifkin’s book is in constant discourse not only about anthropogenic climate 
change, but also the economic stagnation currently facing the United States and 
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European Union.  While most political pundits and economists attribute today’s 
sluggish market to sub-prime mortgage lending, rampant government spending, and 
low consumer confidence, Rifkin turns a completely different direction to understand 
the drivers of the current situation.  He asserts that, in fact, “This wild gyration between 
regrowth and collapse is the endgame” of the waning oil age.4  Instead of focusing on 
lower interest rates and government austerity, then, political elites need to more closely 
consider the sources from which we derive energy, and inherently linked with that, 
GDP.  But this situation cannot be considered in isolation from either energy history or 
the energy future. 
The first and most famous Industrial Revolution, of course, captured the power 
of steam and coal to centralize manufacturing and empower concentrated agricultural 
production.  The second Industrial Revolution paralleled the unprecedented extraction 
of oil reserves from the ground and under the ocean to power the agricultural Green 
Revolution and today’s automobile societies.  Rifkin claims, “The First Industrial 
Revolution gave rise to dense urban cores, tenements, row housing, skyscrapers, and 
multilevel factories, and the Second Industrial Revolution spawned flat suburban tracts 
and industrial parks.”5  The Third Industrial Revolution, though it has not yet taken 
hold, will rely on distributed energy production from largely renewable sources to 
power economic development in both the Global South and North.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Rifkin,	  J.	  The	  Third	  Industrial	  Revolution:	  How	  Lateral	  Power	  is	  Transforming	  Energy,	  the	  
Economy,	  and	  the	  World.	  2011.	  9.	  5	  Ibid.	  37.	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As energy sources such as coal- and natural-gas-fired plants, nuclear plants, and 
incinerators give way to wind, solar, geothermal, and even tidal power, the associated 
economic and political landscapes will too change.  The extraction of coal and oil from 
the earth and the distribution of these resources naturally require a huge capital 
investment.  As such, First and Second Industrial Revolution social structures entail 
centralized economic and political power to drive energy production, and inherently 
the economy, forward.  This takes the form of multinational oil companies, powerful 
political lobbies, and an energy infrastructure based on centralized production and 
long-distance one-way transmission.   
In the envisioned Third Industrial Revolution, though, “dwellings would become 
energy producers,” serving a dual purpose for shelter and renewable production.6  
Though this might take the form of small-scale hydro- or wind-power, by far the most 
potential lies in capturing the sun’s power.  Falling nearly everywhere on the earth’s 
surface, solar power accounts for a daily 76 PW (that is, for reference, 76 billion MW) in 
comparison with wind’s contribution of .37 PW.7  As will be explained in greater depth 
later, efficient and affordable technologies exist in the form of solar thermal collection 
and photovoltaic panels to harness this abundance of naturally occurring power.  
The Third Industrial Revolution will make use of emerging technologies to cut 
dependence on coal, natural gas, and oil.  If Rifkin’s prescriptions are followed, the 
energy sector can be swiftly and effectively decarbonized.  He also discusses the 
trajectories for renewable energy storage and transportation decarbonization that, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Ibid.	  68.	  7	  Kruger,	  P.	  Alternative	  Energy	  Resources:	  The	  Quest	  for	  Sustainable	  Energy.	  2006.	  138.	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no doubt integral to the overall remaking of the dominant energy paradigm, are beyond 
the scope of this examination of solar PV implementation.  In order for the electricity 
sector to be decentralized and remade into a model of sustainable growth, consumers 
and energy networks will rely on smart metering, innovative pricing methods, and the 
continued drop in prices for renewable energy production.  These are technologies and 
trends that are already in wide use, especially in Europe and California8, but an 
examination of their effectiveness can lead to improvements in future implementation 
across the United States and in regions just now experiencing their own Industrial 
Revolutions. 
Though Rifkin never explicitly cites the deep ecology movement as an 
inspiration for the Third Industrial Revolution, there are inherent links between the two 
concepts.  These serve to strengthen the case for distributed generation implementation 
on a much larger scale than has thus far been the case.  In exploring energy 
procurement as a long-term necessity of human survival, Rifkin embraces the much 
deeper time scale put forward by Naess.  He examines not only the current oil-driven 
energy paradigm, but also its rudimentary predecessors and considerably advanced 
successor energy regimes.  His focus on the future of energy procurement recommends 
broad decentralization of contemporary “elite” energy systems.  These systems require 
huge capital investment, economies of scale, and distribution and transmission 
infrastructure to extract highly concentrated underground mineral reserves.  Instead, 
Rifkin favors more socially and environmentally equitable distributed micro-generation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Rifkin.	  43.	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in residential and commercial installations.  This trajectory represents deep ecology’s 
ultimate goal of “classlessness” in the developed world while also shaping a blueprint 
for the developing world to leapfrog centralized resource-extractive landscapes directly 
into the Third Industrial Revolution. 
The inspiration for much of the Third Industrial Revolution comes from the 
European Union, where Rifkin often advises political leaders, not least of whom is 
Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel.  Rifkin cites the EU as “virtually alone among 
the governments of the world in asking the big questions about our future viability as a 
species on Earth.”9  As such, and with Germany as a lead state, Europe has developed 
an ambitious set of targets with a first checkpoint in 2020 toward sourcing a significant 
portion of its energy from renewable sources and increasing efficiency of use.  These 
goals are especially important as the EU expands eastward, most immediately with 
Croatia’s 2013 accession, to impact a larger citizenry.10 
The political parallel between the United States and Europe is imperfect.  The 
federal structures in the United States are similar to the European Union, but ultimately 
lack the supranational cooperation exhibited in the European Union.  There is no higher 
governing body that can effectively impose regulations on the US federal government.  
Nonetheless, the US parallel of Germany’s lead state status is undoubtedly California.  
The state has a history of trickle-up environmental policy, in which state-level measures 
are successfully adapted at the US federal level.  Examples of this successful model 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Ibid.	  Location	  147.	  10	  Castle,	  Stephen.	  "Croatia Given Conditional Approval to Join E.U. in 2013."	  The	  New	  
York	  Times,	  2011.	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include legislation on clean air and water in the 1970s, higher vehicle fuel efficiency 
standards, and the Renewable Portfolio Standards to be discussed in greater depth in 
the following chapters.  This trickle-up idea is essential to breaking the shackles of the 
centralized Second Industrial Revolution and its associated fossil-fuel dependence to 
bring in the Third Industrial Revolution’s lateral vision of micro-generation.  As much 
as the policies implemented on the state level in California can successfully shift the 
sources of energy supply, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and meet rising demand, 
the potential for federal adoption of these measures increases.   
Importance of DG Solar in California 
Sunshine is in prodigious abundance throughout the Golden State, making it an 
ideal testing ground for technologies, policies, and business models poised to harness 
this renewable energy resource.  Historically, though, renewable energy developers 
have focused on more cost-competitive wind technology, winning competitive bids to 
supply utilities with electricity.  Even with recent advances in solar deployment, the 
potential for greater rooftop PV penetration in residential and commercial markets is 
impressive.  Due to utility and policy constraints, most of the renewable supply meeting 
recent goals has come from wind, utility-scale solar, and geothermal operations 
modeled largely after the centralized, elite power plants of the twentieth century.  Such 
“wind farms” and concentrating solar plants capture renewable resources in a few 
remote spots, then rely on massive transmissions lines to convey the energy to urban 
centers.  In this context, Rifkin prudently wonders, “If renewable energies are 
distributed and found in various proportions and frequencies everywhere in the world, 
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why would we want to collect them in only a few central points?”11  In order to truly 
implement a Third Industrial Revolution energy order, work needs to be focused on 
existing programs that further the goal of broader DG implementation. 
In terms of solar electricity generation, there are two principal technologies that 
can each be deployed on two broadly defined installation scales.  To be more specific, 
the technologies are either solar-thermal or photovoltaic and the scale of installation is 
either DG or utility-scale.  Trends in installation segmentation have been dynamic over 
the past decades, dictated mainly by cost reductions through research and 
development.  Where a few years ago, investment in utility-scale installations was 
trending toward concentrating solar power (CSP)—which uses solar-thermal 
technology—the comparative costs of technology today make solar PV “an obvious 
preference.”12 
Solar thermal uses heat from the sun to warm water for household or industrial 
use, while photovoltaic relies on sunlight to fuel chemical reactions that create a direct 
current.  Solar thermal technology was first developed in 1891, but it is in fact “only 
‘solar’ in terms of what makes the heat – the rest of it is basically nineteenth century 
technology.”13 In fact, solar thermal was in rather widespread use in Southern 
California during the late 19th century—more so than today—for the simple purpose of 
heating water.14  PV, on the other hand, actually inverts an electrical current into the 
alternating current that traditionally courses through utility power grids to household 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Rifkin.	  36.	  12	  Vermeer,	  Grace.	  Phone	  Interview.	  Southern	  California	  Edison.	  2012.	  13	  Janardhan	  &	  Fesmire.	  Energy	  Explained.	  2011.	  24.	  14	  Asmus,	  P.	  Introduction	  to	  Energy	  in	  California.	  2009.	  "Solar	  Energy."	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wall outlets.  While these solar panel technologies may look similar in their installed 
form, solar thermal is a much older and therefore rudimentary technology.  While 
extremely well suited to providing hot water for human use, solar thermal falters in 
comparison with PV’s ability to create electricity identical to that produced by fossil fuel 
and nuclear power plants. 
CSP is concentrated in the sense that it makes use of large-scale installations 
(usually on the desert floor) to reflect sunlight to a central tube or tower filled with 
either water or another conductor of heat, such as molten salt, which the benefit of 
regulating temperatures to spread production past only hours of direct sunlight..  
Private investors from abroad (mostly sunny locales like Spain and Israel) and 
California’s own investor-owned utilities (IOUs) have experimented with CSP to meet 
the Renewable Portfolio Standards to be discussed in later chapters.   
In terms of scale of an individual installation, “Distributed, grid-connected PV is 
not a central concern…to most utilities” because of “low levels of market penetration.”15  
While CSP and utility-scale PV plants have the capacity to produce more energy than 
likely any single DG installation, they perpetuate the centralization of the Second 
Industrial Revolution’s elite energy paradigm.  It is unrealistic to expect an energy 
market fueled by renewable sources to operate in exactly the same way as it does in the 
fossil-fueled model to which it offers an alternative.  The current model entails 
centralized electricity production passing along the utility transmission grid to end-of-
the-line consumers.  As the model slowly shifts to a two-way grid, producers, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Schoettl,	  J.	  M.,	  and	  L.	  Lehmann-­‐Ortega.	  "Photovoltaic	  Business	  Models:	  Threat	  Or	  Opportunity	  for	  Utilities.”	  2011.	  145.	  
	  15	  
consumers, and especially utilities will have to rethink their role in the electricity 
market. 
Further, the development of large panels often controversially infringes on 
ecologically sensitive desert environs and encourages soil erosion, whereas rooftop PV 
makes use of areas that have already been impacted by human development.  Another 
drawback of utility-scale systems is that they must be, by their very nature, built far 
from urban and suburban areas of high energy demand, requiring expensive 
transmission lines susceptible to line loss.  In the case of DG, on the other hand, the 
transmission grid is already in place, although it does require significant engineering to 
transform into a “smart grid” capable of efficiently distributing renewable energy and 
supplementing it with conventional utility-scale sources.   
But perhaps the most compelling benefit of DG is its ability to localize, even 
personalize, the understanding of energy use.  A vast majority of electricity ratepayers 
do not understand the abstract wattage figures that represent their energy use.  By 
quantitatively comparing their grid consumption against their ability to generate 
electricity on property, those meaningless figures are transformed into a relatable 
generation capacity against which to compare consumption.  Thus not only does 
distributed generation reduce the need for polluting traditional sources of energy, but it 
also has the potential to augment increases in energy efficiency and reductions in 
overall use. 
Despite these advantages, energy strategies aiming toward a low carbon future 
“have largely concentrated on a vision of major changes to the large-scale centralized 
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supply-side of the system, and by and large assume that demand is an inflexible 
quantity to be met.”16  And while decentralized energy accounts for 7.2% of global 
electricity capacity, this metric is likely considerably lower in the United States, where 
large utilities supply power to grid-dependent customers except in few remote areas.17  
Underlying this fact is a sort of planning inertia, in which governments and utilities 
model emerging renewable generation on the centralized paradigms of the last century.  
Cost has also played a significant role in decision-making on the sources of renewable 
energy.  By only looking for the cheapest solution, most solar applications have thus far 
been beat out by wind and small hydropower, resulting in a poorly diversified supply 
portfolio.  Like solar, wind energy is variable on a short-term basis, depending on wind 
speeds.  Hydropower, while stable in the short term, lends itself to vulnerability 
imposed by climate change’s alterations to the hydrological cycle.  The sun, however, 
will certainly continue to shine daily for the foreseeable future.   
 In contrast to the multiple technological and theoretical shortcomings of CSP, DG 
offers a host of advantages in sustainable future energy procurement.  While CSP uses 
direct sunlight to create electricity, PV panels can also derive power from scattered or 
reflected light, as on a cloudy day or when the sun is relatively low on the horizon.18  
Solar photovoltaic technology also has a higher potential efficiency because there is no 
middle step in the generation process like CSP’s liquid heat medium.19  In terms of 
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transmission, “Locating plants close to where the energy is used also brings down costs 
by eliminating the need to build long transmission lines,” with the ability to place solar 
panels “just about anywhere.”20  Instead of building disruptive new installations far 
from sources of energy demand, DG offers consumers the ability to produce their own 
energy and sell back into the grid for their neighbors’ use.  The lack of transmission 
lines required also entails the possibility for faster implementation built on already-
established home and business electrical connections.  The overall costs of transitioning 
California’s electricity grid to a “smarter” model, though, presents myriad challenges to 
utilities 
It is worth noting, however, that even large-scale DG installations—for example 
those on warehouse and big-box retail outlet roofs—cannot match the generation 
capacity of CSP in a single installation.  Instead of weakening the argument for DG, 
though, this fact merely serves to highlight the widespread degree of implementation 
necessary for PV installations to meet future demand for renewable energy.  With the 
right incentives-based policies and investments in research and development to lower 
the cost of PV, DG can reach the economies of scale required to make it just as attractive 
as wind, small hydro, and geothermal energy.  Compared to a business-as-usual 
scenario, there exists an optimal energy portfolio for California that reduces generating 
costs and CO2 emissions while lowering market risk.  This portfolio includes much 
more renewable energy than has already been installed.21 
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 Given the disparity between advantages of CSP and PV, it comes as little 
surprise that there have been in recent years multiple calls for policies that better 
support DG in residential and commercial applications.  While both types of solar 
technology contribute to decarbonization, reduce reliance on fuel imports, and provide 
zero carbon electricity, proponents of DG hope to expose the underlying message 
implicit in centralized energy production.22  The political and economic power 
structures associated with this paradigm are deeply entrenched in elite control of fossil 
fuels and the production capacity to transform these finite resources into useful energy.  
In 2004, an event in Bonn, Germany drew 3000 attendants from 154 nations calling for 
conditions for DG renewable energy “to become an integral part of the energy mix” 
through “transparent market conditions,” the elimination of “market subsidies for 
conventional centralized energy,” and renewable “incentives that are eventually phased 
out.”23  Again, the parallel federal structures in the United States and the European 
Union expose Germany and California as sources of trickle-up energy policy.  If 
Germany can lead the European charge for distributed energy production, so too can 
California in the United States.   
 Indeed, with anti-government ideology having a strong hold in many pockets of 
Washington, D.C., state and local governments have emerged as “prime laboratories of 
energy reforms in the recent past.”24  And while the credibility of California as a true 
global leader in renewable energy implementation has slipped over the past decades, it 
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is no doubt leading the charge amongst all US states.  With specific regard to policies 
for DG, World Alliance for Decentralized Energy’s Jeff Bell asserts, “Steps to harmonize 
State level policy with policy at the Federal level will be the main factor for successfully 
advancing [distributed electricity].”25  If California consumers, businesses, and utilities 
can harness the power of incentives including investment tax credits, subsidies, and net 
energy metering to take advantage of DG technology, then this model will likely be 
adopted by other states and eventually at the national level. 
Methodology & Structure 
Having built a theoretical base on the tenets of Naess’ deep ecology, established 
Rifkin’s Third Industrial Revolution framework, and explored the merits of distributed 
generation photovoltaic installation, this paper now delves deeper into the specifics of 
California’s energy situation.  The second chapter relies on academic literature, 
historical accounts, and government data to lay a base understanding of the federal and 
state incentives policies for DG renewable deployment.  Chapter three shifts to 
interviews as a primary source to best explain the emerging business models that seek 
to bridge the gap between government incentives and often-under informed 
homeowners lacking the upfront financing for such capital-intensive projects.  These 
include the innovative solar lease and power purchase agreement (PPA) financing 
instruments used to make rooftop solar attractive to a larger portion of Californians 
than only the socially and environmentally conscious early adopters.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Bell.	  2-41.	  
	  20	  
The fourth and final chapter of this paper assesses potential pathways forward 
for electricity consumers, third-party solar developers, and the state’s utilities.  As will 
be discussed, California is headed toward a set of program expiration deadlines that 
will remove DG solar incentives.  Since these incentives have thus far protected solar 
from competition by lower-cost alternatives, the future of continued installations is at 
stake.  Will third-party financing prove to be a sustainable business model without the 
federal and state programs that have thus far built it up?  
Energy Markets & Incentives Programs 
California Energy Market 
1973 Oil Crisis & California’s Wind Rush 
Considering the renewable focus of this project, the most relevant energy history 
begins with the oil crisis of 1973.  The OPEC embargo forced the United States to seek 
out alternative domestic sources of energy to cut dependence on now-demonized 
“foreign oil.”  But as the crisis abated, in a pattern to be repeated after the many price 
spikes following, so too did interest in alternative energies.  As price and supply 
concerns have been joined by those surrounding global climate change, the urgency of 
renewable energy capacity has increased.  This trend is reflected in state and federal 
policy, as well as hard data on installation and capacity figures. 
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In partial response to the 1973 crisis, Congress passed the 1978 National Energy 
Act, part of which is the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).26  PURPA 
defines aspects of both the federal and state regulatory environments in which 
electricity markets operate.  Though a federal policy, the implementation of PURPA 
was left in part to the individual states.  In California, this responsibility fell to the 
already-established California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).  The CPUC has 
regulatory authority over the state’s investor-owned utilities (IOUs), but not publicly 
owned utilities (POU).  POUs are usually wholly owned departments of city 
governments and are therefore overseen at the municipal level.  Data from the 
California Energy Consumption Database reveals that these two types of utilities (IOUs 
and POUs) account for 95% of electricity deliveries in the state, which has held constant 
over the period before deregulation (1990) through to the most recent statistics available 
(2011).  IOUs even gained a percentage point in their share of electricity deliveries over 
this 21-year period.  This data demonstrates the relatively stable segmentation of 
California’s electricity market and legitimizes the CPUC as a relevant institution 
through which to promote renewable energy for a majority of Californians. 
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The overall aim of PURPA was to increase the use of domestic renewable energy 
through the requirement that electric utilities allow “qualifying facilities” (QFs) under 
80 MW to plug into their grid and be paid by the utility at its “avoided cost.”29  This 
avoided cost is the amount the utility would otherwise have to either invest in its own 
generation facilities and fuels or pay to an independent non-QF generator.  
Technologies qualifying for this provision include renewables PV, wind, biomass, and 
geothermal, but also cogeneration facilities whose primary production often depends 
on fossil fuels.   
Great uncertainty in international oil and gas markets at the time allowed many 
California renewable generators to lock in contracts for ten years at rates significantly 
higher than the actual ensuing market prices.  This factor was important in speeding the 
development of wind energy even though the technology’s cost still exceeded that of 
traditional natural gas-fired plants.  The program became very popular, with more than 
15,000 MW of qualifying facilities under contract in 1985.  Utility planners worried that 
the grid would not be able to handle such a large distributed capacity if actually built, 
leading the CPUC to suspend Standard Offer #4, the contract model that most 
independent renewable generators had used to tie in with the grid.  Ultimately, not all 
of the contracted supply was actually built. 
 With a booming population, poor air quality, and now an oil crisis, California 
had certain reason to excel in its ambitions to capitalize on renewable power.  At this 
stage, development centered primarily on wind energy.  This is because wind power, 
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especially on a larger scale, has traditionally held a cost advantage over solar power.  
This point is also likely when California acquired its mythical status as a renewable 
energy “mecca.”30  Federal and state investment credits in California did not always 
align, but for a period from 1980 to 1983 they allowed developers to recoup a full half of 
the installed cost of their systems. This came in the form of two 25% investment tax 
credits—one at the federal level and one at the state level. 31  California’s large utilities 
made a significant contributions to new capacity by purchasing electricity produced by 
desert solar installations and wind farms along hillsides and mountain passes.   
 As the programs and funds advancing renewable energy expired, new 
installations dropped significantly, leaving California with a stagnant wind and solar 
sector.  Thus “the mid-1990s marked a period of decline as the long-term PURPA 
contracts began to expire and some wind projects ceased operating.”32  The image of 
California as the United States’ renewable energy leader continues through today, 
helped somewhat by the substantial incentives to solar photovoltaic generation central 
to this study.  The data is a clear indication, however, that concerns on the part of 
California’s energy producers and consumers over energy supply stoked by the 1973 oil 
crisis had waned by the twentieth century’s closing years.   
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Electricity Market Deregulation 
 Then came California’s “infamous deregulation” of the electricity market.33  
Coming on the tail end of an era of widespread industry deregulation across the United 
States, from airlines to communications, the CPUC favored from the mid-1990s the 
advantages of increased competition and the dismantling of vertical integration.34  
Under Governor Pete Wilson, the 1996 Assembly Bill (AB) 1890 gave legal mandate to 
the partial deregulation of California’s electricity market, most importantly the 
decoupling of electricity generation and distribution.  This meant that the state’s three 
main investor-owned utilities—Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison, and 
San Diego Gas & Electric—had to divest a large part of their electricity generation 
business from their transmission and distribution business. 
“Deregulation,” however, was something of a misnomer.  Toke asserts, 
“Deregulation in electricity does not mean a reduction in regulations; arguably it means 
more regulations, since it creates new markets which need to be defined and 
governance structures which need to be described.”35  In California’s case, the state 
regulatory bodies, namely the CPUC, still had the regulatory power to set price caps on 
customer rates, though not on the wholesale prices paid by utilities to the now-separate 
generation facilities.   
 The ensuing crisis, which came to a head in 2000 and 2001, is of less importance 
to this narrative than the reforms that came after it.  While the deregulation was 
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intended to increase competition and lower costs, the notorious energy giant Enron was 
accused of exporting energy to other states and taking production capacity offline at 
times of peak demand in order to artificially inflate wholesale prices.  There remains 
debate as to what extent out-of-state investors’ “gaming the system” is to blame.  
Regardless of this uncertainty, and in the simplest terms, California’s utilities were 
forced to buy and sell electricity at a loss, leading to the bankruptcy of PG&E and 
almost the same fate for SCE.  By 2000 and 2001, wholesale rates for electricity from 
independent generators had skyrocketed to far exceed the corresponding retail rates, 
which were capped by the deregulation law.  Because of their highly regulated nature 
and commitments, the state’s utilities were squeezed into insolvency, eventually 
leading to a market collapse and state intervention by the State Water Resources 
Control Board. 
 Californians and Americans in general were shocked that such a highly 
advanced economy could suffer from the kind of debilitating blackouts that struck the 
state in 2000 and 2001.  This sentiment no doubt resonated with that of 1970s and 1980s 
spurred by the OPEC oil crisis.  In much the same way, lawmakers turned back to 
budding renewables to diversify the state’s energy portfolio and keep generation, 
transmission, and consumption within California.  Over the roughly twenty years 
between the shocks of the 1973 oil crisis and the 2001 electricity market collapse, the 
costs of various technologies had changed dramatically.  Wind was at this point nearly 
cost-competitive at wholesale prices with traditional energy sources.  And advances in 
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technology, manufacture, and maintenance had made solar PV—while not as affordable 
as wind—closer than ever before to greater market penetration. 
 Many of the same goals motivating electricity regulation and reform in the 
1970s—domestic production, security of supply, and protection from resource price 
shocks—informed the federal and state governments’ response to the electricity crisis of 
2001.  Lawmakers in Sacramento were also able to capitalize on increasing buy-in to 
scientific evidence of global climate change to craft incentives policies to dramatically 
increase renewable installation throughout the state.  The current incentives structure 
provides the regulatory canvas upon which private citizens, utilities, and third-party 
solar developers have installed distributed generation solar capacity. 
Federal Regulation 
The incentives provided at the federal level apply to all states in addition to their 
unique programs and portfolio standards.  According to SunEdison government affairs 
expert Curtis Seymour, virtually all solar installations in the United States depend on 
the Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC) for financing.  This credit is usually referred to as 
the Federal Investment Tax Credit (FITC) in the context of renewable energy financing 
and policy.  The FITC was adopted in the 2005 Energy Policy Act, the first major federal 
update to US electricity policy since PURPA in the 1970s.  For solar generation 
specifically, EPAct 2005 moved federal incentives away from a Production Tax Credit 
(PTC) to a one-time investment-based tax credit.  With the now-familiar aim of 
encouraging domestic renewable energy development, the FITC was offered beginning 
in 2006 and its various expiration dates have been extended by industry lobbying 
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efforts to 2016.  Though it has been suggested that Congress would extend the measure 
to 202036, the current frenzy of “intense debate over the federal budget” means 
“government subsidies for wind and solar power are more contentious than ever.”37 
The Energy Policy Act provides two important tax incentives for renewable 
developers, the first of which is a credit against taxable income.  Developers can claim a 
30% tax credit on qualified expenses related to the installation of a renewable energy 
system. 38 For the average residential system costing around $30,000, this amounts to 
$9,000 in savings.  Since 2008, utilities are also able to take advantage of this incentive 
on their larger-scale projects without any dollar amount cap.  This incentive is a fairly 
straightforward and certainly attractive incentive for both residential customers and 
developers of all size renewable projects. 
In addition to the tax credit, the Energy Policy Act also includes an accelerated 
depreciation provision.  This measure accounts for a “not insignificant benefit to the 
cash flows of the system in the early years.”39  Accelerated depreciation works by 
allowing businesses that invest in solar photovoltaic installations as well as solar 
thermal to write off larger amounts of their taxable income in the first years after a 
system’s installation.  This incentive does not allow businesses to pay less in taxes; 
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depreciation has been exhausted.  The benefit here operates on the time value of money 
principle, which asserts that money today is worth more than money in the future 
because of the possibility to invest it now and garner a return on that investment. 
While these two federal incentives are a significant push for investment in 
renewable installation across all fifty states, they do not apply to all installations.  In 
fact, the accelerated depreciation provision is only available to businesses that make an 
investment in renewable technology, not individual residential producers.  Whether 
intentionally or not, then, the accelerated depreciation part of the federal laws provides 
an advantage for third-party solar developers as compared with individual 
homeowners pursuing distributed generation solar on their own accord.  This could act 
to skew DG solar installations toward larger, more traditionally cost-effective ones. 
Since the 2005 Energy Policy At, these federal incentives have been renewed 
multiple times through differently titled congressional actions, though the details have 
remained relatively constant.  However, the current forecast is for the FITC and 
accelerated depreciation to expire at the end of 2016.  This does not, though, mean an 
end for the program entirely.  The current law dictates that the investment credit will 
drop to a permanent 10% of qualifying costs.  Within the solar industry, there is debate 
as to whether the cost of technology will have fallen sufficiently for it to remain cost-
competitive with traditional electricity generation by that time.  “What more rational 
heads are suggesting,” says Curtis Seymour, “is that instead of going from 30% to 10% 
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on January 1st 2017, that there is some sort of a glide path” decreasing the credit in 5% 
increments over a longer term.40 
Figure 341 
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solar generation represented 1.3% of California’s renewables, while the same figure for 
the US stood just under .3%.42  These figures demonstrate that California’s approach to 
renewables in general and solar energy in particular has been more impactful than that 
of the federal government and many other states’.   
State Regulation 
 Having identified that California’s renewable and solar electricity policies have 
fostered an environment in which those technologies’ capacity far exceeds the national 
average, it is necessary to identify and understand the specific details of those laws.  
Scholars generally buy in to the principle of states as policy “laboratories,” claiming, 
“The value of using quantitative methods to explore the role of policies in development 
is that of supporting maximum impact of government intervention for development of 
renewable energy.”43  Even if California’s policy environment for renewable 
development is not as illustrious as the Promised Land mythology built around it 
during the wind rush of the 1970s and 1980s, it does continue to exceed other states, if 
by a reduced margin.44 Statistics related to solar deployment provided by the Interstate 
Renewable Energy Council are typically less accurate than those collected by the Energy 
Information Administration on traditional electricity sources.  Nonetheless, California 
leads the nation with 328.8 MW of installed solar capacity, accounting for six times the 
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capacity of New Jersey, the next closest—though considerably smaller—state.  Other 
desert states Arizona and Nevada round out the top four.45 
Net Energy Metering  
Since 1996 in California, producers of renewable energy with systems under 1 
MW in size are eligible to enroll in Net Energy Metering (NEM).  Non-profit and 
government producers are allowed to partake in NEM with systems up to 5 MW. 46  
Under guidance from federal regulation and more specific regulation from the CPUC, 
the state’s IOUs and POUs—with the exception of the Los Angeles Department of 
Water and Power—are required to compensate grid-connected electricity generators for 
energy fed back into the grid.  While NEM has been framed by some as a type of Feed-
in Tariff like those of Western Europe, it is more of a “billing construct” than an 
incentive program or premium rate program.47 
NEM is an important piece of California’s electricity market structure that makes 
DG solar PV an attractive option, especially for residential customers.  Unlike wind 
generation, solar electricity is fairly consistent and predictable in its output.  There are 
occasional clouds and weather events that provide an exception to this rule, but solar 
energy production generally follows the sun’s trajectory with peak production just after 
midday.  For commercial installations, this production schedule aligns well with 
demand, however residential peak demand is displaced later in the day to early 
evening “when people come home and it gets dark out, and they turn all the lights on 	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and cook dinner and they run the washing machine.”48  There is therefore a mismatch 
on the individual system level between production and demand, especially for 
residential installations.  With NEM, excess on-site production that is fed back into the 
utility’s grid at midday can offset the cost of utility-generated electricity used when the 
sun is not shining. 
Because NEM producers receive credits against their bill on a monthly basis, 
compensation effectively occurs at the highest-tier retail rate that each customer pays.  
The program thus requires utilities to purchase electricity at the retail rate, which is 
much higher than the alternative of utility-scale PV, which needs to compete at 
wholesale rates against traditional energy sources.  The higher price tag of NEM 
electricity fed back into the grid cuts out any rate markup over wholesale prices that the 
utility would otherwise put toward infrastructure maintenance and development. 
Since 2009, NEM has been extended with the provision of Net Excess Generation 
(NEG).  This enables independent producers to claim actual financial compensation—
not only a billing credit—for generation over a 12-month period that exceeds total 
consumption from the grid.  The compensation is based on day-ahead spot markets for 
the same 12-month billing period, with projections around 4 cents per kWh, well below 
retail prices.49  Essentially, then, DG electricity producers benefit tremendously from 
NEM billing, but much less when their 12-month grid feed-in exceeds their load over 
the same period. 
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Even though the NEG rate is more sustainable from the utility standpoint, 
mainly because it  trends much closer to wholesale rates than retail rates, resistance 
from the utilities paints an uncertain picture of NEM’s role in future solar development.  
In May of 2012, the CPUC held a hearing to better define the five percent limit beyond 
which IOUs are not required to offer NEM.  The three IOUs argue that by reducing the 
rates paid by solar system owners or even eliminating them, non-solar customers are 
being unfairly left with the bill for grid-related services other than pure electricity 
generation.50  The specific argument was over how to define “aggregate customer peak 
demand”, the figure out of which NEM’s five percent cap is derived.  The Interstate 
Renewable Energy Council (IREC) in this instance asked the CPUC for clarification in 
order to ensure security in the industry’s future incentive landscape.  The CPUC ruled 
unanimously in favor of solar advocates, providing a higher cap for NEM 
programming, though it should be noted that five percent—no matter the exact 
definition of peak demand—is extremely limiting for solar as it seeks to rival wind as a 
major renewable player. 
Renewable Portfolio Standard 
California’s most pertinent and contemporary policies for driving renewable 
energy development came directly out of the state’s 2001 energy crisis.  In 2002, 
Governor Gray Davis signed SB 1078, laying out the first components of the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard (RPS).  The RPS does not provide financial incentives for renewable 
production, and as such complements policy goals of the California Solar Initiative 	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(CSI).  The initial incarnation of the RPS called for 20% of retail electricity sales to come 
from renewable sources by 2017.  This quota has been extended through a combination 
of joint CPUC/CEC Energy Action Plans, executive orders, and legislative codification.  
The current objective sees the 20% goal moved up to 2013 with an ultimate 33% by 2020, 
established by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2008 and approved in 2011 by the 
State Legislature and Governor Jerry Brown.51 
Figure 452 
	  
 The Renewable Portfolio Standard is not a policy tool unique by any means to 
California.  By 2000, 13 states had an RPS and that number had more than doubled to 29 
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by 2011.53  Internationally, there are RPS policies in place in Australia, China, the 
European Union, and Japan.  California’s program, like many others, is largely a 
market-based mechanism that allows for flexibility in implementation.  The RPS is less 
concerned with how utilities achieve the retail sales requirements for renewable energy 
than the mere fact that the goals are in fact reached.  Instead of a command-and-control 
type environmental policy, the RPS sets a reasonable goal for solar electricity 
procurement in the service territories of the state’s utilities that can be met however 
their planners see fit.  Any qualifying renewable energy production facility in the state 
receives one Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) per MWh of production.  These 
certificates can then be sold to the entities required by law to meet the RPS, including 
IOUs, POUs, and other retail electricity providers.  There is a declining cap on how 
much of a utility’s renewable procurement can come from “unbundled” RECs 
originating from DG sources.54 
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Figure 5 55,56 
 
California Solar Initiative 
Aside from the RPS is California’s main incentive-based policy, the California 
Solar Initiative (CSI).  In 2006, Environment California, “a statewide, citizen-based 
environmental advocacy organization,” in collaboration with then-Governor 
Schwarzenegger, launched the Million Solar Roofs initiative.  The program operates 
much like the RPS in that it sets an overarching goal to be addressed with more specific 
policies.  In response to the Million Solar Roofs initiative, the California Energy 
Commission (CEC) and CPUC joined their programming together under the heading of 	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the “Go Solar California” campaign.  The campaign includes the CPUC’s CSI, as well as 
the various solar programs administered by the state’s POUs, and the CEC’s New Solar 
Homes Partnership.  However, CSI’s funding and, therefore, impact far outweigh these 
other programs’.   
Figure 6 57,58,59 
  
The CSI’s budget for solar PV is some $2.167 billion, compared with $1.184 
billion for all other programs combined.  Funding for the program comes entirely from 	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ratepayers in the form of a system benefits charge established during deregulation and 
additional surcharges.60  The CSI provides strong financial incentives to residential and 
commercial electricity customers to install solar PV on their property by paying out a 
rebate based on the system’s output.  Projects that can take advantage of the CSI are 
capped at 1MW in installed capacity, a size that is larger than even some utility-scale 
projects.  CSI has five subcomponents, including the General Market Solar Program, the 
largest with a budget of over $2 billion.  Discussion of the other four subcomponents, 
which focus on low-income and multi-family housing and research and development, 
follows below.  There is also a separate component funded by gas ratepayers to 
incentivize the installation of solar water heaters.   
The CSI’s financial incentives come in the form of program rebates, which 
decline on a pre-established ten-step scale based on installed capacity in each of the 
three large IOUs’ service territories.  When the installed capacity for a step is reached, 
the program proceeds to the next step with incrementally smaller monetary incentives 
until the tenth and final step of funding is exhausted.  While the steps are based on 
statewide MW capacity, the administration of the program is left to the IOUs, or in the 
case of SDG&E, the California Center for Sustainable Energy (CCSE).  This means that 
customers in different parts of the state may be at different steps of the rebate program 
at any one point in time.  
Because the range of installation scales varies so drastically within the CSI, there 
are two accounting methods by which the payment of these rebates takes place.  There 
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are the Expected Performance Based Buydown (EPBB) and the Performance Based 
Incentive (PBI).61  The EPBB is available to all systems less than 30 kW and is the 
required method for those systems under 10 kW.  All systems greater than 30 kW are 
required to use the PBI. 
 The EPBB is a one-time lump sum payment based on the expected output of a 
rooftop solar system.  This takes into account the specific system’s manufacturer-
determined specifications, geographic location, angle of installation, sun exposure, and 
other relevant factors.  In this way, the EPBB aims to proportionately incentivize the 
most effective solar installations.  As of November 2012, EPBB payments for residential 
systems are on the tenth and final tier in the service territories of PG&E and SDG&E at 
20 cents per Watt.  In SCE’s service territory, residential payments are on the ninth step 
at 25 cents per Watt.62  For non-residential systems, the program is on the eighth step 
for customers of SDG&E and SCE, while it is on the tenth step for PG&E customers.  
Though the EPBB rates for commercial customers are less relevant because such 
installations usually exceed 30 kW, there is a substantially higher incentive rate for 
nonprofit and government agencies, which are likely to take advantage of the lump-
sum EPBB for their smaller systems. 
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Figure 763 
 
EPBB Payments (per Watt) PBI Payments (per kWh) 
Step 
Statewide 
MW in Step 
Residential 
Non-Residential 
Residential 
Non-Residential 
Commercial 
Government/ 
Non-Profit 
Commercial 
Government/ 
Non-Profit 
1 50 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
2 70 $2.50 $2.50 $3.25 $0.39 $0.39 $0.50 
3 100 $2.20 $2.20 $2.95 $0.34 $0.34 $0.46 
4 130 $1.90 $1.90 $2.65 $0.26 $0.26 $0.37 
5 160 $1.55 $1.55 $2.30 $0.22 $0.22 $0.32 
6 190 $1.10 $1.10 $1.85 $0.15 $0.15 $0.26 
7 215 $0.65 $0.65 $1.40 $0.09 $0.09 $0.19 
8 250 $0.35 $0.35 $1.10 $0.044 $0.044 $0.139 
9 285 $0.25 $0.25 $0.90 $0.032 $0.032 $0.114 
10 350 $0.20 $0.20 $0.70 $0.025 $0.025 $0.088 
 
 The other rebate method, PBI, is optional for systems between 10 kW and 30 kW 
depending on the system area’s utility, and mandatory for systems between 30 kW and 
1 MW.  Installations of this size are typically sited on the tops of warehouses, consumer 
retailers, and large government buildings.  The payment is based on the solar system’s 
actual performance over a five-year period via 60 monthly payments.  The 2012 
program rates stand between 2.5 cents per kWh and 4.4 cents per kWh for residential 
and commercial installations.  Government and non-profit rates are higher, up to 13.9 
cents per kWh.  These latter rebate rates are so high because there is high political will 
in the state for energy- and cost-efficiency in publicly-funded infrastructure and to 
account for the fact that tax-based incentives like FITC do not benefit entities without 
tax liability.  
 The CSI program also benefits tremendously from NEM, especially in view of 
California’s inverted rate structure.  Retail electricity rates are determined in five tiers 
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built on a baseline figure for energy consumption.  As energy consumption increases, so 
too does the price per kWh paid to the utility.  In the same way, drawing less electricity 
from the grid after the installation of a solar PV array allows the ratepayer to avoid the 
most expensive electricity charges from the utility.64  
Because the CSI introduced the policy innovation of tying the progression of the 
ten steps with installed capacity instead of an inflexible time table, there is no way to 
pinpoint the coming end date of the program.  In fact, each of the six segments of the 
rebates—residential and non-residential for each of the three IOUs—will likely stop 
approving new applications at different dates throughout 2013 and 2014.65  PBI 
payments will continue to be paid out, of course, for projects that have already been 
approved for the incentive funding.  At this point, there does not seem to be any push 
in the legislature to renew or extend the CSI.  It is too early to definitively brand this 
program a success, but this paper certainly hopes to portray its significant role in 
furthering solar deployment in California as compared with other US states.     
SASH & MASH 
Critics point to California’s electricity rate structure as contributing to 
socioeconomic inequity in relation to the CSI.  Since solar generators can reduce the 
most expensive electricity per kWh taken from the grid, this unfairly provides the 
largest benefits to the owners of “McMansions” who typically do pay the highest tier 
rates for their grid electricity.66  However, this dissatisfaction with the CSI might be 	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misdirected, as the reason wealthier ratepayers are benefiting more is because of the 
NEM program.  NEM, because of its essence as a “billing construct,” compensates solar 
generators at the retail rate for electricity sold back to the grid.  And while NEM is 
essential to the success of CSI, more generally “nationwide…residential solar is so 
dependent on having these progressive or just NEM policies in place.”67 
Because CSI is funded entirely by ratepayers, the State Legislature initiated a pair 
of programs designed specifically to bring the advantages of DG solar to those living in 
low-income housing.  The 2006 AB 2723 assigned 10% of the CSI budget to low-income 
housing, as something of an “afterthought” to the General Market Program.68  Based on 
this directive, the CPUC decided to evenly split the budget, allocating 5% each towards 
the Single-family Affordable Solar Homes (SASH) and Multi-family Affordable Solar 
Homes (MASH) subcomponents.  Though similar in aim, these programs vary greatly 
in terms of their rebate structure, program administration, and target customers.     
In the early days of CSI implementation, criticism was mounted because, ”as a 
matter of equity, solar energy programs should be designed in a manner that allows all 
contributors to participate.”69  Though low-income ratepayers were footing a 
proportionate share of the bill for CSI rebates, the likelihood that they would benefit 
from the program was extremely low.  Even with the third-party financing possibilities 
discussed below, low-income homeowners’ lack of good consumer credit proves an 
obstacle to such DG solar projects.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Monahan,	  Cathleen.	  Phone	  Interview.	  SASH	  Program	  Officer,	  GRID	  Alternatives,	  2012.	  68	  Ibid.	  69	  Coughlin,	  Jason,	  et	  al.	  A	  Guide	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Within CSI, SASH is unique in that GRID Alternatives is the only program 
administrator for all three major IOU territories.  GRID won the administrative capacity 
in a bidding process before the CPUC, largely because of its prior work starting in 2004 
bringing DG solar to low-income single-family homes.  Oftentimes in such 
communities, bottom-up demand for local solar energy development is low because of 
a lack of information.70  In many cases there is the potential, though, to introduce 
energy efficiency measures alongside distributed generation deployment to 
significantly reduce electricity costs.  While projects before SASH were funded through 
“piecemeal” combinations of in-house fundraising, corporate support, and Habitat for 
Humanity grants, among others, GRID’s work now focuses almost exclusively on 
carrying out SASH’s goal of providing generous rebates for low-income single-family 
homeowners, while providing job training, and solar education in these communities. 
SASH differs from the General Market Solar Program mainly because of its 
“higher upfront rebates” and because “GRID [is] the sole provider of SASH services,” 
from energy efficiency audits to volunteer training and grid interconnection 
procedures.71  This stems from concerns over predatory lending in low-income 
communities and the lack of awareness concerning CSI in these communities.  These 
projects also benefit from the cost-savings offered by having supervised volunteers 
perform panel installation on more than half of SASH installations.   
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In the cases where volunteer labor is not appropriate or sufficient for a SASH 
installation, GRID has relationships with 24 subcontractors that carry out the work.  
This list has been refined from an earlier period that was open to any contractor, which 
resulted in implementation difficulties for the specific customer base of the CSI 
subcomponent.72  GRID also requires that subcontractors hire paid job trainees, in line 
with its job education aims.  Because of the community benefits of in-house GRID 
projects, and as the amount of incentive dollars decreases in the coming years, program 
officer Cathleen Monahan forecasts a reduction of subcontracted work in the program’s 
final stages. 
With SASH’s unique volunteer installation provision, GRID boasts the training of 
10,000 volunteers and success of 1,000 individuals in finding paid jobs in the solar 
industry.  Also, each project undergoes a sizing process that requires an energy 
efficiency audit and accounts for about a fifteen percent reduction in load.  Especially in 
low-income homes, energy efficiency gains can be significant.  These auxiliary benefits 
justify further the larger rebates given to low-income homeowners than in the General 
Market Program. 
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Figure 8 73 
 
CSI’s other low-income subcomponent is MASH, which benefits low-income 
multi-family properties within the three large IOUs’ territories.  Unlike SASH, the same 
authorities administer this program as do the General Market Program—that is, SCE 
and PG&E in their respective territories, and CCSE in SDG&E’s territory.  With the 
same budget as SASH, MASH has double the capacity goal.  This is in large part 
because of the economies of scale inherent in DG solar deployment.  Though 
individuals living in multi-family housing have smaller individual load, their collective 
tie-in to a single system demands a larger capacity than in single-family housing. 
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The implementation of MASH is something of a hybrid between the General 
Market Program and SASH.  It shares with its low-income sister program generous 
rebates and community outreach components.  But unlike in SASH, the impetus for DG 
solar in multi-family housing usually comes from the property owner, “based on the 
economics” of system installation.74  In fact, many of the beneficiaries of MASH are non-
profit communities eager to offer residents a lower electricity bill in line with their more 
general missions.  Also making MASH more akin to the General Market Program is the 
fact that the property owner coordinates project management, not the CPUC-designated 
program administrator.  As such, they are free to choose any contractor to complete 
installation. 
In order for MASH to work successfully, it relies on an extension of NEM called 
Virtual Net Energy Metering (VNEM) for multi-tenant and multi-metered properties.75  
VNEM is vital in allowing multi-family property owners to allocate the benefits of net 
metering to a large number of tenants sharing a single rooftop PV system.  Since 2012, a 
similar VNEM tariff has been introduced for installations outside of the MASH 
program.76  In this way, MASH acted as a pilot program for this important extension of 
state electricity policy to reach a broader share of energy consumers. 
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Figure 9 77 
 
Financing Models & Third-Party Development 
Business Models 
 During the course of the CSI’s implementation, a new set of business models 
sprouted up in California and throughout the United States to take advantage of the 
generous incentive provisions characterized above.  For this analysis’ purposes, “a 
businesses model depicts the mechanisms that enable a firm to create value through the 
value proposition to its potential customers, its value constellation, and how it captures 
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this value to transform it into profits.”78  Third-party solar developers Solar City, 
SunEdison, and Renewable Ventures spearheaded innovations starting in 2004 that 
broadened the possibilities for residential and commercial solar deployment by 
introducing flexible financing on an otherwise expensive endeavor.  Despite the third-
party model having only been in the periphery of policymakers’ minds as they crafted 
the Go Solar California campaign, it rose to greater prominence with each progressive 
step of the rebate program. 
According to Solar City Director of Government Affairs Sanjay Ranchod, “The 
single thing that has made the biggest difference so far in increasing the access to solar 
has been…third-party third-party ownership, in the form of solar leases for residential 
systems and PPAs for commercial systems.”79  Third-party financing acts to transfer up-
front capital costs to a party that can capture available tax benefits with lower cost of 
capital, and allows homeowners with environmental sentiment to forgo the financing, 
building, and maintenance of their systems.80  As mentioned in the discussion of federal 
tax incentives, business developers can also take advantage of a wider range of 
mechanisms like accelerated depreciation. 
 Third-party developers have been key in fulfilling the goals crafted by those who 
put forward the Go Solar California campaign.  They represent the most robust promise 
of a long-term sustainable solar industry, even with the coming expiration of CSI 
rebates and cuts to federal incentives.  Indeed, “The ownership structure of proposed 
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projects can affect whether owners are able to obtain necessary financing and take 
advantage of incentives. The ownership structure may even affect the acceptability of 
the project in the public view; locally owned and community-owned projects may be 
more favorably received.”81  First, this discussion will explore the specific financing and 
business models in which these developers operate.  Then, data from CSI and the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) will confirm that these models have 
been successful in broadening accessibility to DG solar electricity in California. 
Financing Challenges 
Through the federal and state incentives policies and NEM, individual 
homeowners and those owning commercial properties can reap the benefits of 
essentially free solar electricity radiating from the sun to their rooftops.  This 
proposition, though, involves a long payback period on a high upfront equipment 
investment, typically around $40,000 for residential-scale systems and over $1 million 
for commercial-scale (See Figure 10).  Aside from California’s tiered electricity rate 
structure that delivers outsized benefits to heavy electricity consumers through NEM, 
this cost further disadvantages those without large sums of capital or other methods of 
financing.  Further, payback times on these investments are on the order of a decade, 
after which point the investment continues to make a profit through continued lower 
electricity costs.82   
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In many US states, California chief among them, popular sentiment is shifting 
toward an increased awareness of global climate change and the long-term impact of 
our energy choices.  Yet there persists a disconnect between consumer intentions and 
actions.  Even for those willing to commit to long-term financing to purchase a solar PV 
system, “Financing fees and administrative procedures may be prohibitive to small 
developers.”83  The greatest potential for launching distributed generation PV into the 
energy mainstream lies in the ability of “Third-party companies” to “reduce or 
eliminate technological risk and complexity, which is frequently found to be a primary 
concern for potential customers.”84 
Doris et al., in the authors’ examination of state energy policy, also proclaim, 
“Policy measures can address these barriers and make financing available to a broader 
spectrum of projects representing a variety of ownership structures.”85  California has 
also been a lead state in this regard.86  Instead of regulating third-party developers as 
utilities, California Public Utilities Code 218 “states that if the system generates 
non-conventional energy and if you serve two or fewer customers on that property, you 
are not considered” a utility.87  This allowance paves the way for one of the two main 
business models used by solar developers to provide affordable solar PV systems for 
residential and commercial customers, to be described below. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Doris	  et	  al.	  8.	  84	  Drury	  et	  al.	  681-­‐2.	  85	  Doris	  et	  al.	  8.	  86	  Ibid.	  684.	  87	  Kollins	  et	  al.	  42.	  
	  52	  
Figure 10 
Approximate Upfront Investment for DG Solar Systems 
 
 Residential-Scale Commercial-Scale 
Average system size88 5 kW 262 kW 
Approximate cost per Watt89 $8 $4 
Approximate system cost $40,000 $1,048,000 
 
 In order to reduce or eliminate the “several common barriers to obtaining 
financing for renewable energy products,” these third-party developers have created 
innovative leasing and contract mechanisms to offer residential solar with as little initial 
financial requirement as no down payment.   
Solar Lease & Power Purchase Agreement 
The two main advances introduced by third-party solar developers in California 
are the solar lease (stylized as SolarLease® by innovator Solar City) and Purchase Power 
Agreement (PPA).  They are generally quite similar, with some distinctions.  Both solar 
leases and PPAs take advantage of the third-party developer’s significant capital to 
reduce the required up-front investment on the part of consumers.  In both scenarios, 
the third-party developer maintains ownership of the solar PV system and thus claims 
the federal and state incentives.  Whether a customer chooses a solar lease or a PPA 
depends on factors including their utility service territory (IOU or POU), the scale of the 
installation, and the desired payment structure.  “Third-party companies…reduce or 	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  service	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  89	  Vermeer,	  Grace.	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eliminate technology risk and complexity, which is frequently found to be a primary 
concern for potential customers.”90 
In the solar lease model, the third-party developer installs and maintains a solar 
PV array on the property of the customer.  In exchange, the property owner pays a pre-
determined monthly lease charge, similar to an automobile lease.  The lease is non-
traditional in that it is not a direct lease, but rather an operating lease.  This accounting 
arrangement allows for the lessor and lessee to realize the full benefits of accelerated 
depreciation on business but not consumer expenses.  While the investment-related tax 
incentives accrue to the developer (the lessor), all of the electricity produced by the 
system belongs to the lessee.  Therefore, production in excess of onsite load benefits the 
consumer through NEM billing.  This financing structure is cost-neutral or -positive 
when the electricity bill savings experienced by the consumer exceeds monthly lease 
payments to the solar developer.91 
 The solar PPA is more commonly used for commercial-scale DG installations.  
The third-party developer in this case owns and installs the system on the customer’s 
roof.  The developer retains ownership of the system and the electricity it produces.  By 
reaping tax incentive benefits, solar rebates, lower financing fees, and NEM 
compensation, the developer’s value proposition lies in its ability offer the customer 
electricity at a discount to what the utility charges for power from the grid.92  Even 
though the cost per watt installed for solar electricity—and renewables in general—still 
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exceeds that of traditional fossil fuel-fired generation, third-party solar developers are 
able to bring together tax and other government incentives into a simple rate per kWh 
lower than that offered by the utility.   
Figure 11 
Solar Lease Only Shared Attributes PPA Only 
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The market of third-party solar developers is diverse, with both small and large 
players that offer multiple products. These companies take advantage of the incentives 
landscape that underscores California’s need to shift energy sources, which defines 
their general business model and longevity.  Inasmuch as a firm is defined by the role it 
plays along its industry’s value chain, there are numerous approaches filling a gamut of 
market niches.93  Solar developers that have long sold and installed solar PV systems 
have built upon solid financing and credit to widen their reach with solar leases and 
PPAs.  Firms like Solar City, SunEdison, Sungevity, Sun Run, and more have applied 
their financing model across many states, but most focus on California because of its 
generous incentives, ambitious RPS, and strong environmental sentiment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Schoettl	  and	  Lehmann-­‐Ortega.	  148.	  
	  55	  
Success Within CSI 
In spite of the fact that the above detailed innovations in third-party solar 
financing occurred both before and early in the implementation of California’s large 
rebate programs, the full synthesis of the policy and industry did not become apparent 
until midway through the ten-step process.  SunEdison’s first solar PPA predated the 
CSI program upon implantation in 2004, and Solar City pioneered the solar lease in 
2008.94  This particular phenomenon has been easy to discern because of the open 
records and up-to-date statistics offered by the CPUC’s CSI website.95  Broadly speaking 
for California, “third-party PV systems grew from 9% of residential PV installations 
during the first quarter (Q1) of 2009 to 36% of residential PV installations during Q1 
2011.”96  This trend toward third-party ownership has only become more pronounced 
in the later quarters of 2011 and through 2012, as can be ascertained from Figures 12 
and 13.  
This growth was especially slow to take off in the residential sector as compared 
to commercial, business, and non-profit projects.  Financing innovations, though, have 
clearly caught on in a big way for new installations nationwide, and especially in 
California.  Third-party ownership has been described as “just the way the solar 
industry is going.”97 
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Figure 1298 
 
What is perhaps most promising about the advent of third-party financing in 
carrying out the goals of CSI is that, instead of cannibalizing solar deployment on the 
part of wealthy home- and business-owners with the upfront capital to invest in a solar 
PV system, it actually expanded the market.  This is because the third-party finance 
model appeals to “less affluent, younger and less educated populations. By enticing PV 
adoption in new regions with different population demographics, third-party PV 
products appear to be increasing total PV demand, rather than just taking market share 
from existing, customer owned PV demand.”99  
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Figure 13100 
 
Interestingly in the case of California, third-party financing has not played a role 
in SASH, one of the programs targeting low-income residential rooftops.  Seemingly, 
private developers could pass on the benefits of more generous low-income rebates to 
this broader customer base, while providing additional financing capabilities for the 
remaining expenses.  But concerns over consumer protection and credit requirements 
have stood in the way of developing this potential market. 
For SASH specifically, third-party developers offering PPAs and leases were 
explicitly excluded from the program.  This has to do largely with GRID’s status as a 
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one-stop project manager and program administrator.  But pressure from these growing 
businesses has called into question CPUC’s position on the issue.  As the program is 
continually evaluated and reviewed, it is likely that third-party developers and their 
innovative ownership model might be allowed to help low-income customers take 
advantage of SASH rebates.  This represents a key CSI market potential for third-party 
developers, since less than 10MW of the slated 15 MW capacity goal has been reserved 
for funding, and even less actually installed. 
In terms of multi-family housing, the extension of VNEM from only MASH to 
essentially any multi-tenant property also broadens the potential market for solar 
financing.  It remains to be seen, though, whether multi-family property owners will 
recognize the potential benefit of rooftop solar, and by which means of ownership 
structure they will proceed. 
Discussion & Conclusions 
The energy regimes that have powered development and westward expansion in 
America since European colonization are no doubt vital in characterizing the 
sustainability of cultures over time.  Over the past half century, California has 
experienced two dramatic shocks to its energy and electricity markets, the first tied in 
with the rest of the United States and the second uniquely Californian.  As a result of 
both of these events—the oil crisis of 1973 and the California energy crisis of 2001—
policies were implemented to speed the development of alternative energy resources, 
mainly wind and solar, but also combined-cycle, biomass, geothermal, and small hydro.  
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But as the memory of the 1970s oil crisis faded, so too did the public backing for and 
involvement in renewable energy procurement.  This cultural context is just as vital to 
policy as is the recommendation of climate scientists that we immediately transition our 
energy systems away from greenhouse gas-producing fossil fuels. 
In the twenty-first century, the threat of high energy prices for household and 
business use, especially in the transportation sector, continues to be much more visible 
to Californians than it was in the 1980s and 1990s.  And even though dominant modes 
of individual and goods transport remain fossil-fueled, alternatives are appearing 
which attribute their climate friendliness to grid-tied electricity.  Think electric cars, 
buses, and light rail.  This trend in transportation reinforces the importance of 
transitioning sources of electricity from coal, natural gas, and oil to renewables, 
including the state’s readily abundant and reliable solar influx.    
Considering the history of California’s “wind rush” following energy regulatory 
reform in the 1970s, which waned after about fifteen years, solar advocates are eager to 
prevent such a drop-off in new capacity with DG installations.  As the expiration of 
several innovative incentives programs approaches, third-party solar development 
presents the best chance of bringing solar electricity into the mainstream and 
broadening its customer base from the core demographic of wealthy, educated 
urbanites.  These businesses are vital in simplifying the tangle of expenses, 
interconnection procedures, and income associated with rooftop solar into a simple PV 
electricity rate or monthly solar lease payment. 
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The current political moment complicates this goal, though, because of its fiscal 
severity.  Not only does California’s deficit continue to present problems to the state, 
but the federal government also now faces a veritable reckoning when it comes to 
revenue and expenses.  Even if state and federal government programs that support 
solar development must reduce their contributions considerably in light of this debate, 
there remain tried-and-true non-incentives policies to capitalize on the solar push’s 
current inertia. 
The Future of State & Federal Incentives Programs 
The overall effectiveness of CSI in reaching its stated budget and installed 
capacity goals is relatively simple to assess.  This is because, as has been mentioned, the 
progression of rebates along a declining ten-step scheme is tied to comprehensive live 
data on approved solar capacity.  Were the incentives not attractive enough, the 
program would have proceeded more slowly than the anticipated timetable ending in 
2015.  In fact, with the General Market Program subcomponents slated to exhaust their 
respective budgets in 2013 and 2014, the CSI has been quicker than anticipated in 
delivering on state legislators’ vision for a solar California. 
As is readily apparent from the descriptions of the federal and state incentives 
programs encouraging DG rooftop solar, their program life is far from indefinite.  Since 
CSI’s rebate funding is budgeted into different subcomponents and utility territories, 
programs will close on an independent basis between 2012 and 2015, the predetermined 
end date.  Some subcomponents in certain territories, for example MASH dollars in 
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SDG&E’s region, have been fully reserved already, though program administrators are 
expecting some of those reservations to not reach installation.   
For the General Market Program subcomponent of CSI, the rebates still being 
offered are relatively small, especially in comparison with those that were offered in 
2006 at the program’s start.  This demonstrates that independent homeowners—and 
increasingly third-party developers—are able to realize the benefits of smaller-scale DG 
solar in California without state financial support.  Therefore, there is little if any 
discussion of renewing CSI funding past the initial plan.  In terms of California’s other 
non-incentive policies, the RPS could be extended beyond the 33% target to provide 
continued momentum for renewables, an issue that “may come up in the legislature [as 
soon as] 2014.”101 
Since CSI’s low-income programs, SASH and MASH, were introduced after the 
initial subcomponents, they may provide rebate reservations beyond the closure of the 
General Market Solar Program.  The difference for low-income homeowners and 
renters, though, is that these rebates have been much more generous.  Without CSI to 
support the costly investment in solar technology and installation, the likelihood of 
continued expansion in this market segment is unlikely.  Third-party developers are 
hesitant to pick up the slack left by the expiration of rebates for low-income populations 
because of credit concerns.  SolarCity and Sungevity, for instance, both require an 
“excellent” FICO credit score of 700 or greater. 
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For its part, GRID Alternatives is hoping to continue its campaign to “[change] 
the face of…who is today’s solar adoptee.”102  This means returning to non-CSI sources 
of financing, including private and corporate donations, alternative energy grants, and, 
of course, volunteer labor.  They have begun to demonstrate this possibility by 
completing ten pilot projects outside of Denver and opening a Colorado office in 2012. 
Projects of all scale and demographic, though, are threatened by the slated 
expiration of the Federal Investment Tax Credit at the end of 2016.  This end of this 
incentive will impact all types of renewable energy across the fifty states, not only solar 
in California.  But its contribution to DG solar alongside CSI cannot be overlooked.  
Since the removal of a $2,000 system cap in 2009, the FITC has essentially provided a 
30% discount on all upfront renewable investments.103104  It is unlikely that 
technological improvements will further reduce system costs by 30% before the start of 
2017.  This means that solar developers can expect the capital required for investment to 
increase by 20% less whatever drop in prices does materialize by then, accounting for 
the permanent 10% credit starting in 2017.   
No doubt, the solar industry will continue to lobby the federal powers-that-be to 
repeat the pattern of extensions that has thus far defined the FITC.  Such lobbying is 
done largely by the Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA), which also keeps track 
of the industry’s pulse with quarterly research and reporting done in cooperation with 	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Greentech Media.  The recommendation of Curtis Seymour with SunEdison that a FITC 
extension follow a “glide path” is a pertinent one in light of California’s success with 
CSI.  A reducing incentive structure tied to installed Megawatts has the dual benefits of 
extending DG solar deployment nationwide and providing policymakers with 
predictable budgeting and an eventual incentives phase-out.    
The Role of Utilities & Cost Competitiveness 
Even before the expiration of California and federal solar incentives, debate has 
erupted over the future of NEM.  With the CPUC siding most recently with those 
asking for a more expansive definition of the extent to which IOUs must offer NEM, the 
policy’s future will define how utilities evolve with the changing energy landscape and 
where solar competes on price. 
There is certain validity to the argument that NEM is sustainable for neither 
utilities nor traditional ratepayers.  Electricity rates do not merely account for the raw 
materials required to produce traditionally “elite” energy like coal or natural gas.  They 
must also provide utilities with sufficient capital to maintain their grid networks, upon 
which DG installations and NEM inherently rely.  Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect 
utilities to be able to meet their customers’ needs when increasing market penetration of 
solar forces them to compensate producers at retail rates, instead of the much lower 
wholesale rates they pay for utility-scale electricity, regardless of whether it is 
traditionally or renewably sourced. 
However, if net solar electricity fed into the grid from DG installations is 
compensated at wholesale rates, it will make little economic sense for property owners 
	  64	  
and solar developers to continue installing with current component costs.  This 
necessitates some type of hybrid NEM rate that will continue to incentivize rooftop 
solar installation while allowing utilities and ratepayers to invest in grid improvements.  
Such a restructuring is especially important in light of a doubling in nationwide 
electricity demand alongside a halving of spending on grid improvements between 
1975 and 2004. 105  More broadly, California’s electricity grid needs to be strengthened, 
not weakened, in order for increasing distributed source electricity to take production 
share from traditional generation. 
Utilities might also seek greater cooperation or integration with the third-party 
solar developers that have gained considerable traction in California since the 
implementation of CSI.  For example, “Pacific Venture Capital, LLC, a subsidiary of 
PG&E Corporation” in 2010 entered into a financing deal with SolarCity and Sun Run 
that enables the two firms to proceed more quickly with DG installations.106  In light of 
California’s electricity deregulation, though, any such entanglement must proceed with 
caution.  Tighter integration between a financing and electricity-producing entity and a 
CPUC-regulated utility would likely be highly scrutinized. 
Regardless of utility structure, predictions on the falling cost of solar PV 
component costs are dependent on two factors: at what rate and against what 
technologies solar must compete.  As incentives and subsidies start to fall away from 
supporting solar, such production will need to push toward grid parity.  If small-scale 
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solar can continue to compete with retail rates through NEM, the costs are already quite 
competitive.  However, in the wholesale market, solar would have to compete with new 
shale sources of natural gas, the prices of which hydraulic fracturing has pushed to 
“extraordinarily low” levels.107  In competition with shale gas, solar has a competitive 
edge because its use is confined to its location of generation, extending out to the local 
grid.  Natural gas, on the other hand, can be transported long distances, especially in its 
liquid form, to booming overseas markets in Asia and South America.  If natural gas 
exports rise, so too will the domestic price, thereby illuminating solar as an 
advantageous alternative.  
Community Solar 
Largely because of their transparency and size, this study has focused almost 
exclusively on programs available to customers of California’s investor-owned utilities.   
As Figure 6 indicates, though, there have also been programs implemented by 
municipal utilities.  Utility innovations on the part of Sacramento Municipal Utility 
District (SMUD) and Los Angeles’ Department of Water and Power (LADWP) have 
“taken the lead” in attempting for solar development to bridge the gap between 
residential- and utility-scale installations.108  This presents the benefits of lower 
installation cost, broader customer reach, and the same rate reductions that can be 
offered by third-party developers. 
Community-scale projects represent a significant future market for solar 
development in general and especially for third-party ownership models.  Sanjay 	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Ranchod, who advises industry vanguard SolarCity on government affairs notes, 
“Community solar legislation was considered last year in Sacramento, and I expect in 
2013 there will again be an effort to introduce and pass legislation to establish…a 
community solar program in California.”109	  	  The	  push	  for	  community	  solar	  arises	  from	  the	  fact	  that,	  when	  accounting	  for	  structural,	  shading,	  and	  ownership	  factors,	  barely	  more	  than	  20%	  of	  residential	  rooftops	  in	  the	  United	  States	  are	  suitable	  for	  solar	  development.110	  	  With	  the	  economies	  of	  scale	  involved	  in	  a	  larger	  installation,	  in	  tandem	  with	  emergent	  VNEM	  policies,	  community	  solar	  projects	  could	  potentially	  outpace	  individual	  property	  installations	  on	  the	  residential	  side	  of	  third-­‐party	  development. 
Conclusions	  
Solar electricity has shown itself to provide substantial benefits for those who 
decide to install it in a distributed capacity on their property.  Though its market 
penetration represents less than one percent of California’s total in-state electricity 
generation in 2011, the federal and state incentives for DG rooftop solar have made 
tremendous progress in bringing this alternative technology into the mainstream.111  
This dramatically low penetration, in fact, demonstrates more clearly the tremendous 
potential for further growth than it discounts progress to-date.  Especially after 2008, 
third-party developers stepped into the marketplace and greatly expanded the ability 
for home- and business-owners to reap the benefits of solar.   
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In the same way that the FITC paved the way for “Mom and Pop,” a hypothetical 
pair who “own a farm and want to put up a little windmill or a little hydro turbine in 
the stream on their property” to invest in renewables, third-party development made 
the encumbrance of upfront capital even less relevant with their innovative finance 
tools, namely the solar lease and PPA.112  Moving forward, third-party development 
provides great promise for simplifying the process of “going solar” and thereby 
expanding the target demographics of such campaigns.  Challenges to this progress, 
though, manifest in the form of expiring government incentives, systemic uncertainty in 
the California electricity market, and competition from cheap and dirty fossil fuels.   
Developments to watch for include a possible extension of the FITC and/or 
California’s RPS, legislation regarding community solar in California, and CPUC 
decisions on the future of NEM.  These government initiatives, incentives-based and 
otherwise, provide a framework within which third-party solar developers will 
continue to bring savings to customers, while reducing electricity generation’s impact 
on the environment and anthropogenic climate change.  Shifting sources of grid-tied 
electricity to emissions-free solar and other renewable technologies is vital not only for 
lighting and heating homes and keeping businesses running, but also in decarbonizing 
the transportation sector, currently the single greatest contributor to greenhouse gas 
emissions in California.113  Ultimately, electricity’s shift to renewable sources should be 
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accompanied by a shift in energy regimes, where distributed generation solar plays a 
major role in personalizing energy use and does away with the elite, centralized 
production of centuries past. 
 Within the deep ecology and Third Industrial Revolution frameworks, the third-
party solar developer model presents tremendous promise.  By redefining the typical 
demographic of solar adoptees, third-party finance, as well as California’s low-income 
solar programs, has begun to chip away at the ecological damage and social inequity 
inherent in fossil-fueled energy systems.  Each new solar lease or PPA brings California 
closer to Rifkin’s vision of a completely distributed, smart-grid dependent energy 
regime.  Certainly, DG solar is by no means the only focus in reforming energy policy, 
but its increasing adoption, backed by the momentum created by state and federal 
incentives, is one of the most readily available and accessible modes of citizen 
participation in transforming the sources of grid-tied energy. 
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